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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff .and Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. W. STEW ART, 
Defendarnt am Appell(J.J'nt. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 8378 
8T'ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 30th day of November, 19·53, appellant, as 
purchaser, and A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney, his 
wife, as sellers, executed and delivered a contract, com-
monly known as an Earnest Money Receipt, under the 
terms of which appellant agreed to purchase, and the 
Cheneys agreed to sell, a certain farm in Davis County, 
Utah, for·a total sale price' of $23,647.80, payable as fol-
lows: 
"Arrangements to pay banks in the amounts 
set forth amounting to $17,647.80, also $6000.00 
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2 
payable to Ace Cheney, which is the total of the 
purchase price as above." 
Nowhere in the agreement are the banks referred 
to named. Plaintiff, Continental Bank and Trust Com-
pany, hereinafter referred to as "Continental", claiming 
as a third-party beneficiary under the agreement, alleg-
ing that it was one of the banks referred to in the con-
tract, brought action against Stewart, the defendant and 
appellant, for the sum of $6694.16. (R. 1) Defendant by 
answer denied that Continental was one of the hanks re-
ferred to in the agreement. The Trial Court, sitting 
without a jury, entered judgment in favor of Continental 
and against the appellant for the sum of $709'5.81, to-
gether with costs. 
The seller, Cheney, testified that at the time the 
contract was executed it was agreed that appellant would 
assume obligations owing to the Barnes Banking Com-
pany in the amount of approximately $11,420.00, and to 
Continental in the amount of $6280.00. The appellant 
Stewart testified that he agreed to pay obligations owing 
to Barnes Banking Company of Kaysville and Valley 
State Bank of Salt Lake City; that the obligations which 
he was to pay were those secured by liens and mortgages 
upon the land which he was purchasing, and that he un-
derstood that the total amount of the secured obligations 
was the sum of $17,647.80, although the same was not 
itemized for him. The obligations owing hy Cheney to 
Oontinental were unsecured. 
At the time of the execution of said agreement there 
were notes owing by Cheney to Barnes Banking Com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
m. 
3 
pany, secured by mortgages upon his real property, 
totaling approximately $11,350.00, and there was a norte 
owing by Cheney to Valley State Bank upon his real 
property and some cattle secured by a mortgage to Valley 
State Bank in the amount of approximately $4,132.00, a 
total of approximately $15,482.00. These were the only 
obligations secured by liens or mortgages upon the real 
property. Thus, for appellant to obtain clear title to the 
real property which he purchased, he was obliged to pay 
approximately $15,482.00, in payment of notes secured 
by mortgages upon the land. He deeded land in Texas 
to Cheney in lieu of a cash paJinent of $6000.00. If he is 
required to pay the judgment granted in this case·, the 
total cost of the farm to appellant will be approximately 
$28,577.00 instead of the sum of $23,647.80, which appel-
}ant agreed to pay as the full purchase price thereof. 
The appellant contended that the obligation which 
he was to pay to banks were those secured by liens and 
mortgages upon the real property. In his oral testimony 
Cheney denied that the obligations to be paid were those 
secured by liens and mortgages. However, four· days 
after the execution of the Earnest Money Receipt Cheney 
and Stewart signed an agreement, Exhibit 3-D, which 
recited: 
"That whereas Asahel W. Cheney and Robert 
W. Stewart have heretofore executed an agree-
ment for the sale and purchase of a farm in Kays-
ville together with the personal property located 
thereon, and Robert W. Stewart has agreed to 
pay therefor the sum of $6000.00 and assume all 
obligations secured by liens or mortgages uporn 
the real prop-erty." (Italics ours) 
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On March 2'5, 1954, fifteen days after the complaint 
in this cause was filed, a Sum1nons and copy of Complaint 
was served upon the appellant in the case of A. ,V. Cheney 
v. R. W. Stewart, Exhibit 2-D, in which complaint A. W. 
Cheney alleged: 
"1. That on the 30th day of November, 1953, 
defendant entered into a written agreement with 
plaintiff for the purchase by defendant of real 
property owned by plaintiff located in Davis 
County, Utah, a copy of which agreement is at-
tached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and by this re-
ference made a part hereof, whereby defendant 
undertook to pay $23,647.80 for said property, 
payable $17,647.80 to banks holding various liens 
and mortgages on said property and $6000.00 to 
plaintiff. 
''2. That prior to the execution of said agree-
ment plaintiff and defendant had agreed, in con-
sidera,tion of said purchase and sale and in con-
sideration of plaintiff's investigation and possible 
purchase by plaintiff of land in Texas owned by 
defendant, that defendant should pay plaintiff the 
sum of $25,647.80, payable $17,647.80 to banks 
hold~ng various liens and 'mortgages on the Davis 
Cownty, Utah, property, and $8000.00 to plaintiff, 
$2000.00 to be paid in cash to plaintiff prior to 
plaintiff's departure for Texas on or about Nov-
ember 30, 1953." (Italics ours) 
One of the points relied upon by the defendant for 
a reversal of the judgment is that the judgment is not 
supported by sufficient, competent evidence, and it is 
manifest that the findings and judgment of the trial 
court are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as 
to indicate a misconception of or lack of consideration 
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of the evidence. It is, therefore, necessary to review the 
evidence offered and received at the trial. 
The only witness called by Continental was A. W. 
Cheney, who testified as follows: 
That because of his wife's sickness, he had been 
forced to borrow until it appeared he would lose his farm, 
and that he listed the same with Mr. C. Ed Lewis for sale; 
that he met Mr. Stewart, and that they two signed the 
agreement, Exhibit 1, heretofore referred to. (R. 6) That 
he, Stewart and Mr. Bell, the real estate agent, held a 
conversation at the home of Cheney about three days 
prior to the date of the agreeinent. (R. 7 -9) That he told 
Mr. Stewart and Mr. Bell that he owed Barnes Bank 
eleven thousand four hundred twenty some odd dollars, 
and that he owed Continental because they had put up 
money for remodeling his house, ( R. 9), and Stewart 
told him he would personally take care of the obligation 
to Continental and see it was paid. (R. 10) That he had 
received a statement from Continental the day before 
and he gave the amount of the obligation to Mr. Stewart; 
that he read the statement from Mr. Steffensen of the 
Bank, and that it was $6280.00. (R. 10) That all the notes 
owing to the Barnes Bank, totaled $11,420.00. That sub-
sequently on the date when the contract was signed Bell 
and Stewart called again at the home, at which time Bell 
rehearsed the agreement asking Stewart if he under-
stood he was to pay the Barnes Bank $11,420.00, and that 
he was to pay Continental $6280.00, to which he answered 
"yes," and he would take care of them personally. Bell 
asked Stewart if he also understood that he was to pay 
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Cheney $6000.00, or give hin1 sOine property in Texas 
equivalent to $6000.00, to which Stewart answered ''yes"; 
that before signing the agreernent the said sun1s were 
totaled, making twenty-three thousand six hundred and 
some odd dollars. The agreement, Exhibit 1, was then 
signed. (R. 13) That about four or five days after the ex-
ecution of the agreement a deed to the property being 
sold was delivered to Stewart, and that the other items 
mentioned in Exhibit 1 were transferred to Stewart. (R. 
14) That Stewart transferred title to the property in 
Texas to Mr. Cheney in lieu of the $6000.00 cash. (R. 15) 
That Stewart had not paid the indebtedness to Continent-
al. Continental sued Cheney and obtained a judgment. 
That later while in court on a supplemental proceeding, 
Cheney showed the sales agreement to Judge Ellett. He 
turned to the Bank's attorneys and told them this was 
a bona fide agreement and for them to look to Mr. Stew-
art for the money. (R. 15) 
On cross examination Cheney stated that the obliga-
tion owed to Continental was not a lien on the property, 
and that he was fully aware of that fact at the time the 
negotiations were conducted. (R. 16) T~hat the Contin-
ental obligation was about the only unsecured obligation 
he owed. (R. 17) That he did not say while he was con-
ducting negotiations with Bell and Stewart that he owed 
some obligation to Continental, but it was not a lien, and, 
therefore, would not be considered in the transaction. 
(R. 17) That it was not the understanding between him 
and Stewart that other than the $6000.00 that the obliga-
tions which Stewart was to pay were those secured by 
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liens and mortgages upon the property. (R. 18) Cheney 
was then asked if he had ever seen the lawsuit which he 
had filed against Stewart, to which he answered, "yes"; 
and that he gave the information contained in the com-
plaint to his attorney, Mr. Greenwood. Defendant's Ex-
hibit 2-D was then offered and received pro forma. (R. 
18) On redirect examination Cheney testified that the 
Valley State Bank obligation, concerning which he had 
testified, was secured by a Chattel Mortgage on the cows, 
but was not secured by a mortgage on the land; that the 
original amount of s·aid obligation was $3600.00, and that 
there was owing on that obligation on November 30th 
between twenty-two and twenty-three hundred dollars. 
(R.19). 
Thereupon the respondent rested. 
Appellant then called Mr. E. Earl Greenwood, Jr., 
who testified that he was a practicing attorney, and that 
he prepared a Smnmons and Cornplaint in the case of 
A. W. Cheney v. R. W. Stewart, and that said complaint 
was defendant's proposed Exhibit 2-D; that the complaint 
was prepared upon information furnished to him by Mr. 
Cheney. (R. 21) The following portion of the cOinplaint 
was then read to the witness: 
"That on the 30th day of November, 1953, 
defendant entered into a written agreement with 
plaintiff for the purchase by defendant of real 
property owned by plaintiff located in Davis 
County, Utah, copy of which agreement is attached 
hereto, marked Exhibit A, and by this reference 
made a part hereof, whereby defendant undertook 
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to pay $23,647.80 for said property payable $17,-
647.80 to hanks holding various liens and mort-
gages upon said premises." 
The witness was then asked if that was the information 
furnished by Mr. Cheney. Upon objection to the question 
the Court asked if Counsel proposed the question as im-
peachment, to which Counsel answered, "yes." The Court 
then stated that Mr. Cheney had not been asked any im-
peaching questions, to which Counsel replied tliat he had 
attempted to ask the questions, but had been ruled out 
by the Court. The witness was then dismissed. 
Cheney was recalled and was asked whether at the 
time he gave Mr. Greenwood the information from which 
he prepared the complaint of A. W. Cheney against R. 
W. Stewart he told Mr. Greenwood that the contract pro-
vided for the payment by Mr. Stewart of obligations se-
cured by liens and mortgages upon his property. He 
stated he did not remember that part of it at all. (R. 23) 
He was asked whether in connection with the $17,000.00 
he discussed whether or not the obligations were secured 
by liens and mortgages. He answered that there was 
$11,420.00 secured by mortgage with the Barnes Bank, 
and that Stewart agreed to pay the Continental Bank 
$6280.00. He was then asked whether or not the full 
obligation was represented by obligations secured by liens 
and mortgages upon the property. He answered that he 
did not remember the liens and mortgages part of it, and 
when pressed for an answer he denied making the state-
ment. He stated he did not remember, and when asked 
whether he thought he might have told Mr. Stewart that, 
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he stated that he would leave that up to the intelligence of 
his attorney. (R. 24). 
Mr. Marl Oakley Bell was then sworn and testified. 
He stated he was employed by C. Ed Lewis, a real estate 
broker, and that he conducted the negotiations between 
Cheney and Stewart. (R. 25) That Cheney had slips of 
paper showing his obligations, which they totaled up; that 
there were three banks involved upon which he had slips, 
one of them was the Valley State Bank, the other was the 
Barnes Bank, and then Cheney mentioned the Continental 
Bank, but that Continental did not have a lien on the 
property. (R. 27) That the figures were furnished by 
Cheney; that he took the Valley Bank and the Barnes 
Bank figures, (R. 30) ; that he just recollected there were 
the two Banks, the Barnes Bank and the Valley Bank, 
(R. 31), and that they had liens on the property. (R. 31) 
That he thought the only figures he had were the secured 
obligations, (R. 31), but he did not remember exactly 
the indebtedness owing to the banks, but he thought the 
whole obligation was sixteen thousand some odd dollars 
that was secured by mortgage, (R. 32), and that the sum 
included all of the mortgages against the property. 
On cross examination he testified that he was only 
interested in the liens on the property, and that his re-
collection was that the Barnes Bank and the Valley State 
Bank were the only banks represented in the tabulation 
of figures. (R. 34) That Continental was mentioned, 
but it was mentioned as being unsecured. All of the 
Banks, Valley Bank, Barnes Bank and ContinE-ntal Bank 
were discussed, and it was mentioned that Continental 
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Bank did not have a mortgage on the property. That 
is all the witness re1nembered concerning the 1natter. (R. 
34) The witness was asked if it was possible that Con-
tinental's indebtedness might have been included in the 
tabulation even though it was understood it was not a se-
cured obligation, to which the witness answered, it could 
have been. On redirect examination the witness was 
asked whether, according to his best recollection, the Con-
tinental obligation was included, and he answered that it 
wasn't included. (R. 35) 
Mr. W. E. Myrick was then sworn and testified that 
he was an officer of the Valley State Bank, and that he 
was acquainted with Stewart; that his Bank had had con-
siderable dealings with Cheney beginning in 1950; that in 
November, 1953, his Bank held a contract and a Chattel 
Mortgage secured by crops and cattle. The Bank held a 
mortgage upon the land of Cheney held by Utah Invest-
ment Company of which the witness was the Secretary. 
( R. 36) The officers of the Valley State Bank and the 
Utah Investment Company are the same. That Stewart 
has paid off the obligations. (R. 37) 
Defendant Robert Wilson Stewart was then sworn 
and testified as follows : 
Prior to signing the agreement he and Bell and 
Cheney discussed the obligations due on the property 
at Cheney's place. Cheney mentioned a number of places 
where he was indebted. The witness remembered espe-
cially the Barnes Bank and the Valley State Bank, and 
he thought the Continental Bank could have been men-
tioned, hut he didn't remember. That he wanted only to 
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assume the obligations that were against the real prop-
erty; that he stated he would assume only the obligations 
that were liens and mortgages against the real property. 
(R. 42) Cheney mentioned the Barnes Bank, and he men-
tioned the Valley State Bank, and said he owed them so 
much. He checked the records at the County Court House 
and found that the obligations to the Barnes Bank was 
secured. He found out that the obligation to the Valley 
State Bank was secured. Cheney mentioned that he had 
an obligation at the Continental Bank, but that it was not 
secured. (R. 43) He was asked if he knew what obligations 
were included in the sum of $17,647.00. He stated they 
were not listed, not itemized; that .Mr. Cheney merely 
stated he owed so much, giving the total, and the wit-
nesses agreed to pay the Banks that total. (R. 44) That 
on December 3rd, immediately after signing the contract, 
the witness wanted a clarification from Cheney as to what 
Banks were involved in the deal. (R. 44) That he and 
Mr. Cheney then signed an agreement, Defendant's Ex-
hibit 3-D. (R. 46) The witness testified that he said to 
Cheney that he had agreed to pay to the banks a stipu-
lated amount, which was the amount represented by 
liens· and mortgages against the property, and Cheney 
agreed with him. That Exhibit 3-D was drawn up to 
confirm the agreement. (R. 49) Subsequently, the witness 
had a conversation with Cheney in which he stated he had 
found out that he owed the Barnes Bank so much, the 
Valley State Bank so much, and that he had an FHA 
against the Continental, that all of the obligations totaled 
between $28,000.00 and $29,000.00, and that he had agreed 
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to pay approximately $23,000.00, to which Cheney an-
swered that Continental did not have a lien or mortgage 
on the property. (R.. 50) That he did not ever agree with 
Cheney to pay the Continental obligation. (R. 51) 
On cross exmnination Stewart testified as follows: 
That he ha~ signed the Earnest Money Receipt and 
given it to Bell, and that he was not present when Cheney 
signed the same. (R. 53) That a day or two before the 
Earnest Money Receipt was signed he had been out to 
Cheney's place with Bell. (R. 54) He agreed to pay so 
much money, but did not know what banks he owed to 
or exactly how much. (R. 55) Prior to the signing of the 
agreement he knew that so much was owing to the Valley 
State Bank, so much was owing to the Barnes Bank, the 
Continental was 1nentioned and skipped because it wasn't 
a lien against the property. (R. 56) That prior to signing 
the agreement the witness, Bell and Cheney sat down and 
discussed the property with the obligations against it. 
He remembered that certain amounts were given by 
Cheney as representing the loans and mortgages against 
the real property. He was present at that time, which was 
a day or two before the Earnest Money Receipt was 
signed. (R. 59) Cheney mentioned that he owed certain 
amounts secured by a mortgage on cattle, that he wasn't 
going to buy the cattle, so the mortgage against the 
cattle made no difference. That he had two mortgages 
against the cattle, one against the cattle only, the other 
a mortgage upon the cattle and the land. (R. 61) That 
when he agreed to pay the banks which had liens upon 
the property, he knew the Valley State Bank had a lien 
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against the property. (R. 62) He knew that the Valley 
State Bank had a mortgage on the cows, which mortgage 
was also against the land. Cheney had told him so. (R. 
64) That the Valley State Bank mortgage on the cows, 
the Barnes Bank mortgage on the land and the Valley 
State Bank mortgages on the cows and land were dis-
cussed with the witness. (R. 66) That the obligation to 
Continental was briefly passed over. It was mentioned 
as an obligation that wasn't a lien- on the property. (R. 
67) The witness then stated he didn't remember whether 
or not the Continental Bank obligation was discussed at 
the conversation prior to the signing of the agreement. 
That the obligation secured by the mortgage on the cows 
alone wasn't a part of the deal for the payment of in-
debtedness owing to the banks. ( R. 69) That the mort-
gages he was to pay were the Barnes Bank land mort-
gage, and the Valley State mortgage on the land and the 
cows. (R. 69) That after the Earnest Money Receipt was 
signed defendant went into the Continental Bank shortly 
thereafter. Before he signed the obligation he knew 
there was a debt to the Continental Bank, like he knew 
about Cheney's doctor bill and his bill for his furniture. 
(R. 71) He went into the Bank after the meeting at Mr. 
Iverson's office on December 3rd, and he found out about 
the amount of the indebtedness. He did not make any 
arrangements to pay the indebtedness. He needed fi-
nances for the place, and he saw Mr. Stevens about fi-
nancing the place. (R. 72) That no financing was ex-
tended to him. (R. 72) Before going to Mr. Iverson's of-
fice he had gone to the Valley State Bank and the Barnes 
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Bank and their obligations totaled a little less than $17,-
000.00, which obligations did not include the Continental 
Bank obligation. (R. 76) That he agreed to pay a certain 
indebtedness owing to banks on liens against the prop-
erty, but the specific amount wasn't broken down as to 
how much to pay one hank or how much to pay another 
bank. (R. 81) That before he signed the Earnest Money 
Receipt he talked to Mr. Gailey of the Barnes Bank. (R. 
85) He knew what the indebtedness was to Barnes Bank 
before he signed the Earnest Money agreement. (R. 87) 
That the amount which he learned from the Barnes Bank 
was owing and the amount that Cheney had told him was 
owing to the Barnes Bank were not the same. (R. 87) 
That he checked the liens at the County Court House 
and the amount of the liens were not more than he had 
agreed to pay. (R. 89) The other obligation he was going 
to pay besides the Barnes Bank was the Valley State 
Bank. (R. 90)' 
Mr. John R. Gailey was then sworn and testified as 
follows: 
That he is the President of Barnes Banking Company 
of Kaysville, and has been connected with the Bank for 
fifty-eight years; that over a number of years he had a 
series of transactions with Cheney. The witness was 
asked if he had a record of the obligations that were 
owing by Cheney to the Bank in 1953. ( R. 91) He stated 
they had one note dated August 16, 1944, on which there 
remained an unpaid balance of $4970.50, upon which the 
interest had been paid to November 16, 19·52. That note 
was secured by a first mortgage on the real estate and 
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water right owned by Mr. Cheney. He had another note 
that had been paid down to $4080.00, and a new note of 
$6000.00 that was secured by a mortgage dated August 
13, 1953. ( R. 92) On November 30, 1953, he had sold to 
the Valley State Bank the $4480.00 note, which had been 
reduced to $4080.00. The sale of that note was made to 
the Valley State Bank in November for $4080.00, plus 
$40.00 interest, or a total of $4120.00. HP. had agreed to 
sell the $6000.00 note to :Mr. Myrick of the Valley State 
Bank, which was to be picked up and paid for within one 
year. The date of the $6000.00 note was August 13, 1953. 
The interest owing on the $4970.00 note on November 30, 
1953, would be the interest from November 16, 1952, at 
6%. (R. 93) The interest owing on the $6000.00 note would 
be interest at 6% from August 13, 1953. On November 30, 
1953, the Barnes Banking Company still held in its bank 
the $6000.00 note and the $4970.00 note, and had sold and 
delivered to the Valley State Bank on the 13th of N ovem-
ber, 1953, the note for $4080.00 upon which there was 
$40.00 interest. (R. 94) All three of the notes were se-
cured by mortgages on real property. (R. 94-95) The 
note for $4080.00, which had been sold to Valley State 
Bank, was a second mortgage and also included a mort-
gage upon some cattle. That prior to the time he made 
his deal with Cheney, Mr. Stewart went to the Barnes 
Bank to discuss the matter of the mortgages owing 
by Mr. Cheney. (R. 95) 
On cross examination Mr. Gailey testified that 
nothing had been paid on the $6000.00 note and it was 
secured by a real estate mortgage which was second to 
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the real estate mortgage securing the $4970.50 note. 
The note for $4080.00 was secured by the same mortgage 
as the note for $6000.00. One mortgage covered both 
notes. He had so~d the $4480.00 and the $6000.00 notes 
to the Valley State Bank. The Valley State Bank had 
paid $4080.00 plus interest for the one note, and had obli-
gated itself and promised to pay for the $6000.00 note. 
The Valley State Bank had not yet paid the $6000.00. (R. 
96) The mortgage securing the $6000.00 note wouldn't 
be released without payment of both the $6000.00 and the 
$4000.00 notes. If Mr. Cheney had gone ·to the Bank and 
told Mr. Gailey that he wanted to pay the notes he had 
with the Bank, he would have included all three notes. 
(R. 97) That the records of the Bank on November 30, 
1953, would show that there was owing to the Bank 
$4970.00 plus interest, and $6000.00 plus interest, which 
would total something like $11,420.00, but that wasn't 
what he would have taken to satisfy the mortgages. (R. 
95) 
On redirect examination Mr. Gailey was asked if all 
of the obligations had been satisfied so far as the Bank 
was concerned, and he answered : "Yes. We are not 
claiming anything under them." (R. 99) 
Mr. William E. Myrick was then sworn and testified 
as follows: 
The Utah Investment Company made a deal to 
buy the second mortgage on the $4080.00 note and the 
$6000.00 note, and at the time of the trial both the 
$6000.00 and the $4900.00 note have been paid. (R. 100) 
The notes were paid by Mr. Stewart. (R. 101-2) 
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On cross examination n1r. Myrick testified that the 
Utah Investment Company purchased the notes and mort-
gages from Barnes Banking Company. He is Vice Presi-
dent of Valley State Bank. On November 30, 1953, Val-
ley State Bank held a note of :Mr. Cheney for $3600.00 
original amount, which had been paid down to $2860.00 
as of November 30, 19·53. 
On redirect examination Mr. Myrick stated he was 
Secretary of the Utah Investment Company and the ac-
tive Agent of that Company in transacting its business, 
(R. 102), and that the office of the Utah Investment Com-
pany is in the Valley State Bank office. ( R. 105) 
Thereupon the appellant rested. 
The Court found that the "Banks" referred to in the 
Agreement of Sale and Purchase executed by Cheney and 
his wife, as sellers, and Stewart, as buyer, were Contin-
ental and Barnes Bank, and that the "amount" referred to 
in said Agreement was the amount due and owing said 
banks on November 30, 1953, and that in consequence of 
the failure of Stewart to pay Continental the amount due 
on November 30, 1953, judgments were rendered against 
Cheney and his wife in favor of Continental in the total 
amount of $6694.16. (R. 110) 
The Court entered Conclusions of Law to the effect 
that on November 30, 1953, defendant Stewart entered 
into a contract with Cheney and his wife for the benefit 
of Continental by the terms of which Stewart agreed to 
pay to Continental the sum of $6280.00 in consideration 
of the transfer of real and personal property by Cheney 
and his wife to Stewart, and that Stewart failed to make 
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payment to Continental contrary to the terms of the 
Agreement, and as a consequence judgments were entered 
against Cheney and his wife in the amount of $6694.16, 
(R. 110-111), and that the difference between $669·4.16 
and $6280.00 was represented by addrtional charges 
assessed against Cheney and his wife as a direct and fore-
seeable result of the failure of Stewart to perform the 
obligations assu1ned by him under said Agreement and 
that Continental is entitled to judgment against Stewart 
in the amount of $6694.16, together with interest at the 
rate of 6% per annum from the date of the institution 
of this action, March 10, 1954, in the sum of $401.65. (R. 
111) 
Upon these Findings and Conclusions the Court en-
tered judgment in favor of Continental and against 
Stewart in the sum of $7095.81. (R.112) 
To the foregoing Findings, Conclusions and J udg-
ment appellant filed a Motion to Amend and Strike Por-
tions of said Findings, Conclusions and Judgment upon 
the ground that the same were not supported by the evi-
dence. (R. 113) 
Appellant also filed a Motion for New Trial. (R.118) 
Appellant's motions aforesaid were denied. (R. 115) 
This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment so en-
tered and the whole thereof. 
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN THE 
SUM OF $7095.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. ' 
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POINT II 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY 
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVER-
WHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF. 
POINT III 
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
PREVAIL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN THE 
SUM OF $7095.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The Court concluded that Continental was entitled 
to judgment against the appellant in the sum of $6694.16, 
with interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date 
of the filing of the action in the amount of $401.65, mak-
ing a total of $7095.81. (R. 111) As to the interest part 
of the judgment, appellant would not complain if the con-
clusion that Continental was entitled to judgment against 
appellant in the amount of $6694.16 principal were sup-
ported by the evidence. But it is not. The only evidence 
that plaintiff adduced as to the amount owed by Cheney 
to Continental, and which it asserts Stewart agreed to 
assume and pay is the oral evidence of Cheney that he 
owed Continental $6280.00 on November 30, 1953. (R. 
12-13) Just before plaintiff rested plaintiff's Counsel 
made the following statement: 
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"The amount, Your Honor, of the indebted-
ness between Cheney and Stewart is admitted in 
the . answer to be $6694.16, and, calling Your 
Honor's attention to that fact, the plaintiff will 
rest." ( R. 20) 
This statement of Counsel is incorrect. (R. 2) Defendant 
in his Answer admitted that Cheney was indebted to Con-
tinental in the sum of $6694.16 on the date of the filing 
of plaintiff's complaint, March 10, 19·54. (R. 2) How-
ever, an admission that Cheney was indebted to Contin-
ental in the amount of $6694.16 on the lOth day of March, 
1954, certainly is not an admission that appellant was in-
debted to Cheney in that amount. Assuming for sake of 
argument that Cheney owed Continental $6280.00 on 
November 30, 19'53, and assuming that Stewart agreed 
to pay Cheney's obligation of $6280.00 to Continental, 
which appellant denies, there is nothing in the record to 
sustain the finding that Stewart owed Continental 
$6,694.16 on April 9, 1954. Interest from November 30, 
1953, on $6280.00 at the rate of 6% per annum, (if such 
was the rate of interest that Cheney was to pay), would 
be approximately $104.66. The total amount due on 
March 10, 1954, would be $6280.00 principal, plus $104.66 
interest, a total of $6384.66. 
To support the judgtnent the Court found: 
''As a consequence of the failure of defendant, 
R. W. Stewart to pay plaintiff, The Continental 
Bank and Trust Company, the amount due on 
November 30, 1953, judgments were entered 
against A. W. .Cheney and Effie S. Cheney in 
favor of plaintiff, The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company, in the total amount of $6694.16." (R. 
110) 
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A search of the record will disclose that not a word of 
evidence was adduced as to how the amount of $6694.16 
was established. 
The Court concluded as follows: 
''The difference between $6694.16 and $6,280.00, 
was represented by additional charges assessed 
against A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney 
as a direct and foreseeable result of the failure 
of the defendant, R. W. Stewart to perform the 
obligations assumed by hun under said agree-
ment." (R. 111) 
Again, a check of the record will disclose that not one 
word of evidence was adduced on the matter of the dif-
ference between $6694.16 and $6280.00. Thus, the judg-
ment against Stewart is wholly unsupported by any evi-
dence. 
Appellant calls attention of the Court to the affi-
davit of appellant's Counsel, which stands uncontradicted 
in the record, to the effect that subsequent to the trial of 
this cause the files and records of the Third Judicial 
District Court were checked and disclosed the following 
facts: 
That Continental filed two suits on December 16, 
1953, and two suits on January 4, 1954, again~t Cheney. 
Judgments were entered on the suits filed on December 
16, 1953, on January 19, 1954. On the suits filed January 
4, 1954, judgments were entered on January 29, 1954. 
The total amounts of principal and interest included in 
all four judgments was $5990.96. (R. 116) 
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POINT II 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY 
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND 
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVER-
WHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF. 
Appellant is aware of the rule that this Court will 
not weigh evidence and will sustain a judg1nent in a law 
actiDn if the same is supported by competent, substan-
tial evidence. But, as the Court said in Jensen v. Howell, 
75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, 1037: 
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of find-
ings of a trial court in law cases is different from 
that in equity cases. In the former, the findings, 
as a general rule, are approved if there is suffi-
cient competent evidence to support them and 
. ordinarily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest 
that they are so clearly against the weight of the 
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a 
due consideration of it." 
This Court in the recent case of Seybold v. Union 
Pac. R. R. Co., 239 P. (2d) 174, reversed the findings of 
the jury, and in that case stated: 
''If there is any substantial, competent evi-
dence upon which a jury acting fairly and reason-
ably could make the finding, it should stand. But if 
the finding. is so plainly unreasonable as to con-
vince the court that no jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could make such a finding, it cannot be 
said to be supported by substantial evidence.'' 
Appellant submits that applying the rule laid down 
in Seybold v. Uruion Pac. R. R. Co., next supra, the find-
ings of the trial judge are_ so plainly unreasonable as to 
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be convincing that the court did not act fairly and reason-
ably in making his finding, that Stewart agreed to pay 
the obligation owed by Cheney to Continental, and, there-
fore, his findings and the judgment thereon are not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
The only evidence that could be said to support the 
finding that appellant agreed to pay the obligations owed 
by Cheney to Continental is found in the oral testimony 
of Cheney. He testified that prior to the signing of the 
agreement he told Stewart and Bell, the real estate agent, 
that he owed the Barnes Bank eleven thousand four hun-
dred twenty some odd dollars, and that he owed Contin-
ental, because they had put up money for remodeling his 
house, and Stewart told him he would personally take care 
of the obligation to Continental, (R. 9-10); that he had 
received a statement from Continental the day before 
from :Mr. Steffensen of that Bank, and he gave Stewart 
the amount of the obligation which he had received from 
Mr. Steffensen. (R. 10) Cheney further testified that on 
the day the contract was signed Bell and Stewart called 
at his home at which time Bell rehearsed the agreement, 
asking Stewart if he understood he was to pay the Barnes 
Bank $11,420.00, and that he was to pay Continental 
$6280.00, to which Stewart answered "yes," and that he 
would take care of the obligations personally. 
Appellant submits that when considered in connec-
tion with the following, Cheney's testimony does not con-
stitute substantial evidence: 
(a) Cheney was an interested witness and because 
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of his interest and resulting bias his testilnony is of very 
questionable value. 
, (b) His testimony in support of the aforesaid find-
ing and judgment is all oral. 
(c) His oral testimony is contradicted by written 
testimony. 
(d) His actions subsequent to November 30, 1953, 
do not accord with his oral testimony. 
(e) His testimony is contradicted by Bell, a disinter-
ested witness, and Stewart, an interested witness. 
(f) Accepting his testimony results in a judgment 
that is harsh, unfair and inequitable. 
Cheney was an interested witness. It is obvious that 
if he can shift the burden of the judgments which Con-
tinental obtained against him to Stewart, he stands to 
benefit by so much. His testimony should, therefore, be 
considered in the light of his interest. 
As stated at 23 C.J. 46 Sec.1789: 
"Interest or other bias of a witness may im-
pair the weight of his testimony, whether it is 
positive or negative and conversely the rubsence of 
any interest or bias operates in favor of the wit-
ness." 
As stated at 32 C.J.S.1065, Sec. 1026: 
"The bias of a witness has a well known and 
pernicious influence in quickening or deadening 
his memory. This is especially true when he testi-
fies to conversations with or oral statements made 
by others." 
This rule is well illustrated in the case at bar by the 
answers of Cheney as recorded at R. 24, where, on being 
pressed for a direct answer to the question of whether 
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or not he had told his attorney, Mr. Greenwood, that he 
had agreed on November 30, 1953, that the obligations 
which were to be paid by Stewart were those secured by 
liens and mortgages upon his farm, he was asked the 
following questions, and gave the following answers: 
"Q. Did you discuss whether or not the full obli-
gation was represented by obligations secured 
by liens or mortgages upon the property1 
Answer yes or no. 
A. I don't remember 'liens or Inortgages' part 
at all. 
Q. You don't remember that at all1 
A. No. 
Q. Do you deny you told him that~ 
A. No, I don't deny; I just don't remember. 
Q. Do you think you may have told him that~ 
A. I would leave that up to the intelligence of my 
attorney." 
The foregoing testimony comes under the class of 
evidence referred to in Footnote No. 53 to Sec. 1031, of 
32 C.J.S. 1071: 
''Evasive evidence of the 'I don't remember 
class' is of doubtful probative force." 
In the case of Holt v .Ind. Com., 96 Utah 484, 87 P. 
(2d) 286, the Court stated that the fact that the parties 
were interested in the outcome of the case was to be 
considered in determining whether any weight should be 
given their testimony relative to the ultimate fact which 
determined their liability. 
The credit to be given the testimony of an interested 
witness was discussed in Montanya v. Brown, 84 P. (2d) 
161, at 163, where the court said: 
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''An exceedingly well considered case on the 
question of credibility of interested witnesses 
which arose in connection with evidence justifying 
a directed verdict is that of J erke v. Dehnont State 
Bank, 54 S.D. 446; 223 N.W. 585, 7:2 ALR 7. After 
reviewing numerous cases throughout the United 
States the court says, (page 591): 
"'A majority of the courts, however, have an-
nounced other views on this question indicating 
in substance the view that it is not a reasonable 
thing to say, in general, that a witness has per-
jured himself or has testified falsely, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, merely because of an 
interest in the case where his testimony is not 
contradicted, is not opposed to general human ex-
perience, is not inherently improbable, and is not 
put in question by other circumstances appearing 
in the case.' '' 
The testimony of Cheney is not supported by any 
of the qualifications of reliable testimony of an inter-
ested party as set forth in the above quotation. His testi-
mony is flatly contradicted by Stewart and Bell. It is 
opposed to general human experience because anyone 
who has had experience purchasing real property does 
not buy property and agree to pay unsecured obliga-
tions of the seller with the purchase price, if the secured 
and unsecured obligations exceed the purchase price. 
Appellant stated he had had considerable experience in 
dealing with real estate, (R. 67), and that he had checked 
the records at the Court House to ascertain what liens 
there were against the property. (R. 88-89) The testi-
mony of Cheney is inherently improbable for the wbove 
reasons. The testimony of Cheney is certainly put in 
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• 
question by other circumstances appearing in the case, 
to wit: his written agreement of four days later, Decem-
ber 3, 1953, in which he stated the appellant was to pay 
obligations secured by liens and mortgages on the prop-
erty; four Inonths later Cheney's attorney filed a com-
plaint in which the statement is twice made that appellant 
was to pay obligations to Banks secured by liens and 
mortgages; and by the facts that he apparently did not 
report to Continental that appellant had agreed to make 
payment of his obligations until several months after 
suits had been filed by Continental against him and judg-
ments had been obtained, and he was called into court 
on a supplemental proceeding in connection therewith. 
(R.15) 
As stated before, Cheney's testimony, upon which 
Continental must rely, is all oral. His oral testim·ony 
is contradicted by his written agreement. In such case 
oral testimony is accorded little or no probative weight. 
In 23 O.J. 54, Sec. 1796, the text writer states: 
"The triers of fact are not however bound to 
accept the testimony of a single witness as true, 
even though he is not contradicted, and the courts 
have frequently held the testimony of a single 
witness not to be such clear and convineing proof 
as is required to sustain a verdict or finding 
where it is offered for the purpose of varying or 
contradicting a writing.'' 
It is true that in the case at bar the oral testimony 
was not given for the purpose of directly varying a writ-
ten instrument, but Cheney's oral testimony is contra-
dicted by his written agreement of four days later. (Ex. 
3-D) 
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• 
As the Court said in T,aylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 717; 
127 P. 66, at 68: 
''But of course the court was not bound to ac-
cept this explanation; and it is well recognized 
as a matter of law as well as of plain common 
sense that an aceount of a transaction, given in a 
contemporaneous writing when no differences 
have arisen, is to be preferred to a subsequent 
oral explanation at variance with the writing 
given after differences have arisen." 
To the same effect is the holding in the case of Smith 
v. Goethe, 115 P. 223, 159 Cal. 628, where the Court said: 
''The uncertain statements of Carmichael, 
made years after the event under examination, 
should not be permitted to prevail against the 
formal written declaration of the parties made 
at the time of the transaction and as part of it." 
Again appellant calls attention to the complaint filed 
on March 25, 1954, wherein Cheney's attorney in two 
places stated in the complaint that the obligation which 
appellant was to pay was "to banks holding various 
liens and mortgages on said property." 
'Cheney's actions subsequent to November 30, 1953, 
do not accord with his oral testiinony. Cheney testified 
that he had received a statement from Continental the 
day before his conversation with Mr. Stewart and Mr. 
Bell concerning the obligations that Cheney was to pay, 
and that he read the statement from Mr. Steffensen of the 
bank (Continental), and it was $6280.00. (R. 10) The 
contract was signed on November 30, 1953. Cheney con-
tended that the contract provided that appellant would 
pay his obligations to Continental. Yet, on December 16, 
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19·53, Continental sued Cheney on two notes and took 
judgment thereon on January 19, 1954. Again on J anu-
ary -+, 1954, Continental sued Cheney on two notes and 
took judgments thereon on January 29, 1954. (R. 116) 
Apparently Cheney failed to communicate the informa-
tion to Continental that appellant had agreed to pay 
his obligations to Continental, and Continental did not 
learn thereof until Cheney, while in court on a supple-
mental proceeding, gave them the information. (R. 15) 
In this same connection the signing of the agreement 
December 3, 19·53, and the filing of the action by his at-
torney against Stewart should be considered. 
Cheney's testimony is contradicted by Bell, a dis-
interested witness, and by Stewart, an interested wit-
ness. 
Accepting Cheney's testimony results in a judgment 
that is harsh, unfair and inequitable. As heretofore 
pointed out the contract provided for the payment by ap-
pellant for the property of the sum of $23,647.80, "which 
is the total of the purchase price as above." (Ex. 1-P) 
Appellant deeded property to Cheney in Texas in lieu 
of $6000.00 cash, which he had agreed to pay to Cheney, 
(R. 15), and has paid obligations secured by mortgages 
on the property totaling, with interest to November 30, 
1953, approximately $15,482.62, (R. 94-95-96), a total of 
approximately $21,482.62. If the judgment of the lower 
court is affirmed, Stewart will be required to pay $6,-
280.00, plus interest and other items, concerning which we 
have no evidence. The sum of said amounts which he has 
paid, and will be obliged to pay, if the judgment is af-
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finned, not including interest and the other items, is ap-
proximately $27,762.62, approximately $4125.00 more 
than he agreed to pay for the property. The beneficiary 
of this injustice to appellant would be Continental, which 
has not given one cent consideration therefor. 
The rule announced in the case of Caine v. Hagen-
barth, 106 P. 945, 37 Utah 69, that the interpretation of 
an ambiguous contract, which is harsh, unfair and in-
equitable, should not be invoked. In that case the Court 
reversed findings and judgment of the trial court. The 
case was a law case apparently tried by the court without 
a jury and had many of the same elements as the case 
at bar. In that case at page 948 of 106 P., the Court 
said: 
"The case of Coghlan v. Stetson, (C.C.) 19 
Fed. 727, affords a striking illustration of how 
far courts are sometimes required to depart from 
the mere dry words of the parties in their con-
tracts in order to preserve their real intention and 
to prevent injustice. Justice Cox, in speaking for 
the court, in that case at page 729 says: 
" 'The interpretation contended for by defend-
ant is so harsh, so unfair, so wanting in recipro-
city, that the court should not hesitate to reject it, 
provided that the instrument is susceptible of any 
reasonable construction. * * *If the language used 
clearly establishes the defendant's version, it 
would unquestionably be the duty of the court to 
enforce it. But where the exact meaning is in 
doubt where the language used is contradictory 
and obscure, if there are two interpretations, one 
of which establishes a comparatively equitaJble 
contract and the other an unconscionable one, the 
former construction should prevail.' " 
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The court in the same case at page 953 said : 
"We are further convinced that if such a 
promise had been squarely demanded by respond-
ents from appellant, he would have promptly re-
fused to make it. l\1:oreover, the demand of re-
spondents, in view of what they had to sell and 
did sell, is unfair, unjust and wholly inequitable. 
For this reason, if for no other, therefore, we may 
invoke the doctrine laid down by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the opinion inN oon-
an v. Bradley, 9 Wall., where, at page 407, (19 
L. Ed. 757), Mr. Justice Field states it in the fol-
lowing language : 
" 'When an instrument is susceptible of two 
constructions-the one working injustice and the 
other consistent with the right of the case-that 
should be favored which standeth with the right.'" 
POINT III 
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO 
PREVAIL. 
There is one fact which is uncontradicted in the evi-
dence: the total price to be paid for the land being sold 
by Cheney was $23,647.80. (Ex. 1-P) 
As heretofore pointed out, if appellant is required 
to pay the judgment entered by the lower court, the total 
cost to him of the property, including the secured obliga-
tions owing on November 30, 1953, which he has paid, are 
$15,482.62, plus the $6000.00 represented by the land 
deeded to Cheney in Texas, plus that part of the judg-
ment which Cheney alleges was owing as of November 
30, 1953, would be the amount of $27,762.62. These mat-
ters are uncontradicted. 
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If Cheney were plaintiff in this cause instead of 
Continental, a judgment in favor of Cheney, regardless 
of his statement that the obligations to banks 1nentioned 
in the contract included Continental, certainly would not 
stand. Yet the law ~ tnat Continental, as a third-party 
beneficiary, is in no better position than Cheney would be, 
if Cheney were bringing the action. 
The law in this matter is set forth in 17 C.J.S. 1137, 
Sec. 519. The text writer there states: 
"The rights of a third person to sue on a con-
tract made for his benefit depend on the terms 
of the agreement and are no greater than those 
gran ted by the con tract as in tended by the parties 
thereto. To recover the beneficiary must bring 
himself within its terms and construction of the 
contract is involved. Since recovery on a third 
person beneficiary con tract is a recovery on the 
contract itself, the right of the beneficiary is no 
greater than if the contract were enforced between 
the nominal parties, the beneficiary being in no 
better position than the promisee." (Citing cases, 
footnotes Nos. 70 and 71) 
It is inconceivable that a judgment such as the Trial 
Court entered in this matter would be sustained if plain-
tiff in this case had been Cheney instead of Continental. 
Appellant calls attention to another rule of law, that 
the right of a third person to sue on a contract for his 
benefit is subject to a modification of the agreement, 
and a discharge of the promisor by the promisee or a 
variation of the contract by them, is effective against a 
creditor beneficiary, if the creditor does not bring suit 
upon the promisee or otherwise materially change his 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
position in reliance thereon before he knows of the dis-
charge or variation. 17 C.J.S. 1138, Section 519. 
In this case, had appellant desired to plead some-
thing which was not exactly true, he could have alleged 
that the agreement of December 3rd was a modification 
of the agreement of November 30th, and by the terms of 
the modification only those obligations "secured by liens 
or mortgages upon the real property" (Ex. 3-D) were to 
be paid by him. Continental knew nothing of the agree-
ment apparently, and took no action until four months 
later. If such agreement were a modification of the 
agreement of November 30th, there could be no question 
of the non-liability of appellant to Continental. However, 
it was not intended as a modification of the agreement 
of November 30, 1953, and, therefore, appellant did not 
plead it as such not attempt to set it up as a modifica-
tion. It was merely a clarification of the agreement. It 
is noteworthy that Cheney made no attempt to make 
any other explanation of that agreement. 
Thus, as a matter of law, Continental being in no 
better position than Cheney should not be permitted to 
recover as against appellant. 
For the reasons above stated, appellant submits that 
the judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON, 
Attorney for Appella;nt. 
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